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Abstract 
Why is GDP growth so much more volatile in poor countries than in rich ones? We identify four possible 
reasons: (i) poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors; (ii) poor countries specialize in fewer sectors; (iii) 
poor countries experience more frequent and more severe aggregate shocks (e.g. from macroeconomic policy); 
and (iv) poor countries' macroeconomic fluctuations are more highly correlated with the shocks of the sectors 
they specialize in. We show how to decompose volatility into these four sources, quantify their contribution to 
aggregate volatility, and study how they relate to the stage of development. We document the following 
regularities. First, as countries develop, their productive structure moves from more volatile to less volatile 
sectors. Second, the level of specialization declines with development at early stages, and slowly increases at 
later stages of development. Third, the volatility of country-specific macroeconomic shocks falls with 
development. Fourth, the covariance between sector-specific and country-specific shocks does not vary 
systematically with the level of development. We argue that many theories linking volatility and development 
are not consistent with these findings and suggest new directions for future theoretical work. 
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Introduction
An important theme in the growth and development literature is the relationship between
volatility, diversication, and economic development. In a seminal paper, Lucas (1988)
observes that developed countries tend to exhibit stable growth rates over long periods
of time, whereas poorer countries are prone to sharp uctuations in growth rates. This
relationship is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the standard deviation of annual (per
capita) growth rates against the level of real GDP per capita for a large cross section of
countries.
Understanding the sources of volatility is a rst-order issue for less developed countries,
for not only are income uctuations larger and more abrupt in these economies, but also
their ability to hedge against uctuations is particularly limited by the weakness of their
nancial infrastructure.
This paper presents a new approach to identifying and quantifying the sources of volatil-
ity. In particular, the analysis identies four components of the volatility of aggregate GDP
growth. The rst component relates to the volatility of sectoral shocks: an economy that
specializes in sectors that exhibit high intrinsic volatility will tend to experience higher ag-
gregate volatility. The second component relates to the degree of specialization: an economy
whose productive structure is highly concentrated in few sectors will tend to be more risk
prone. The third component relates to aggregate country-specic shocks: some countries
are subject to greater policy and political instability. The fourth component relates to the
covariance between country-specic and sector-specic shocks: for example, scal or mone-
tary policy innovations in some countries might be correlated with the shocks to particular
sectors. We show how to decompose overall volatility as the sum of these four components.
The breakdown of volatility into these four components is important for at least two
reasons. First, it helps to point out the potential areas to which risk management e¤orts
should be directed. If, for example, a large part of a countrys volatility is accounted for
by high exposure to a few high-risk sectors, then policies aimed at mitigating volatility (or
its consequences) should probably focus on the development and strengthening of nancial
institutions and, perhaps, on the diversication of the economy. If, instead, most of the
volatility is due to country-specic shocks, then attention should probably be directed to
macroeconomic policy (i.e., excessive volatility might reect inadequate aggregate domestic
policies). Second, as we discuss below, this breakdown helps to empirically assess existing
theoretical models linking volatility and development, and can thus shed more light on the
underlying mechanisms generating volatility.
The empirical analysis leads to the following ndings. First, as countries develop, they
tend to move towards sectors with lower intrinsic volatility.1 Second, sectoral concentration
sharply declines with the level of income at early stages of development, whereas at later
stages it tends to increase with income. These ndings indicate that there is no one-to-one
relationship between sectoral riskiness and concentration: The relatively higher concentra-
tion observed at later stages of development tends to occur in low-volatility sectors. Third,
country-specic volatility falls with development. This result could be the outcome of greater
political stability and sounder macroeconomic policies in more developed economies. Finally,
the covariance between country- and sector-specic shocks shows no systematic pattern with
respect to the level of development.
As the previous qualitative description suggests, poor countries are more volatile because
they specialize in fewer and more volatile sectors and because they experience more frequent
and more severe aggregate shocks. Quantitatively, roughly 60 percent of the di¤erences in
volatility between poor and rich countries can be accounted for by di¤erences in country-
specic volatility, whereas the remaining 40 percent is accounted for by di¤erences in the
sectoral composition.
Our study relates to a vast theoretical literature that yields direct predictions on the
relationship between risk, diversication, and development. In particular, the nding that
countries tend to exhibit high sectoral concentration at early stages of development is in
line with Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997): Early in the development process diversication
opportunities are limited, owing to the scarcity of capital and the indivisibility of investment
projects. However, these authors, as well as Obstfeld (1994), Saint-Paul (1992), and Green-
wood and Jovanovic (1990) predict that at early stages of development countries will seek
insurance by investing in safer (even if less productive) sectors.2 According to our ndings,
instead, not only are poorer countries highly concentrated in a few sectors, but also those
sectors carry particularly high sector-specic risk, which is hard to reconcile with existing
theories. In addition, most models explicitly (e.g., Obstfeld (1994) and Saint-Paul (1992)) or
implicitly (e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)) take
a portfolio choiceview: high sectoral productivity comes at the cost of higher risk. This
view is inconsistent with the empirical lack of trade-o¤ between volatility and productivity
levels in sectoral data.3
1In the analysis we distinguish between global sectoral shocks, which are common to all countries, and idio-
syncratic sectoral shocks, which di¤er across countries. Both dimensions of sectoral risk decrease monotoni-
cally with the level of development.
2Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) refer to projects and sectors interchangeably (p. 711). It is of course pos-
sible that sectors are not the relevant empirical counterparts of their theory. However, given that developing
countries are subject to the highest sectoral risk, it is unlikely that they choose the safest projects as implied
by the model.
3A di¤erent view is taken by Kraay and Ventura (2001). Their model of comparative advantage is
consistent with the lack of tradeo¤ between risk and productivity; the model only features macroeconomic
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Our work also relates to a recent contribution by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), who pro-
vide an empirical characterization of the relationship between sectoral concentration and
development.4 Our paper has a broader focus, in that we look at all of the sources of the
volatility-development pattern and not only the degree of sectoral concentration. This allows
us to quantitatively asses the relative importance of the various components of volatility as
well as to make a closer contact with the theoretical literature linking volatility and devel-
opment.5
Finally, our paper is methodologically related to the work of Stockman (1988), who
decomposes the variance of industrial output growth in seven European countries. We go
beyond the variance-decomposition analysis performed by Stockman (1988) both by deriving
quantitative risk measures for the various components of volatility and by linking them to
the level of development.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce the
methodology to study the di¤erent components of volatility. In Section 2, we introduce the
data set. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 performs a set of robustness
tests. Section 5 presents our conclusions and directions for future research.
1 Methodology
Twomain ideas underlie the discussion over the determinants of the volatility of GDP growth.
The rst emphasizes the role of the sectoral composition of the economy as the main cul-
prit for volatility: excessive specialization or specialization in high-risk sectors translate into
high aggregate volatility.6 The second idea points to domestic macroeconomic risk, possi-
bly related to policy mismanagement or political instability, among other country-specic
factors.7
The emphasis on sectoral composition motivates us to rst break down the value added of
a country into the sum of the value added of di¤erent sectors, each of which has a potentially
di¤erent level of intrinsic volatility. Innovations in the growth rate of GDP per worker in
country j, (j = 1; :::; J) denoted by qj, can then be expressed, as a rst-order approximation,
shocks (and di¤erential sectoral responses to these shocks), but could potentially be extended to feature
sector-specic shocks.
4Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003) study the relationship between specialization and nancial
openness.
5Studies on aggregate volatility, most notably Ramey and Ramey (1995), Kose, Otrok and Whiteman
(2003) do not study sectoral shocks, which is the critical element that allows us to discriminate among the
theories discussed before. Note that Ramey and Ramey (1995) study the link between volatility and growth,
whereas our focus is on the link between volatility (and its components) and the level of development. Our
contribution can hence be seen as complementary.
6See, for example, Burns (1960), Newbery and Stiglitz (1984), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Saint-
Paul (1992), Obstfeld (1994), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), and Kraay and Ventura (2001).
7See, for example, Hopenhayn and Muniagurria (1996), and Gavin and Hausmann (1998).
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as the weighted sum of the innovations in the growth rates of value-added per worker in every
sector, yjs, with s = 1; :::; S:
qj =
SX
s=1
ajsyjs,
where the weights, ajs, denote the share of employment in sector s of country j. The object
of our study is the variance of qj, Var(qj), and its components.
To separate the role of domestic aggregate risk from that of the sectoral composition of
the economy, we can further breakdown innovations to a sectors growth rate, yjs, into three
disturbances:
yjs = s + j + "js: (1)
The rst disturbance (s) is specic to a sector, but common to all countries. This includes,
for example, a shock to the price of a major input in production, such as steel, which may
a¤ect the productivity of sectors that are steel-intensive. More generally, technology- and
price-shocks that a¤ect a sector or group of sectors across countries will fall in this category.
The second disturbance (j) is specic to a country, but common to all sectors within a
country. So, for example, a monetary tightening in country j might deteriorate the produc-
tivity of all sectors in country j, because all need some amount of liquidity to produce.
The third disturbance ("js) captures the residual unexplained by the other two. In the
previous example, if some sectors are more sensitive to the liquidity squeeze and have a
deeper fall in productivity, the di¤erence with respect to the average will be reected in "js.
Similarly, if some global shocks have di¤erent impact on sectoral productivity in di¤erent
countries, the di¤erential impact will be captured by "js. Finally, any disturbance specic
to both a country and sector will be reected in "js.
Of course all three disturbances can potentially be correlated with each other. For exam-
ple, s and j will tend to be correlated if in some countries macroeconomic policies are more
responsive to global sectoral shocks, or, alternatively, if a country is highly inuential in a
particular sector, in which case an aggregate shock in that country may a¤ect that sector in
other countries. Similarly, as pointed out above, certain sectors may be more responsive to
country-specic shocks (implying that "js and j could be correlated) or sectoral productiv-
ity in certain countries may be a¤ected di¤erently by global sectoral shocks (implying that
"js and s could be correlated).
Expression (1) provides a convenient way of partitioning the data. Written as such, it is
simply an accounting identity, since the residual picks up everything not accounted for by
the sector-or country-specic shocks, and since we do not place any restriction on the way
the three disturbances covary.8
8In the robustness section we discuss alternative ways of breaking down the data on yjs. In particular,
we consider the partition yjs = Bjs + bsj + "js; where Bj captures the di¤erential impact of gobal shocks
on sectoral productivity, by country, and bs captures the di¤erential impact of country-specic shocks, by
sector. Recall that in specication (1), the di¤erential impact of these shocks is captured by the residual
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In what follows, we explain how to decompose the variance of qj into the corresponding
variances and covariances of these di¤erent disturbances.
1.1 Volatility Decomposition
It is convenient to rewrite innovations to growth of GDP per capita in matrix notation.
Denoting by yj the vector of sectoral innovations yjs and by aj the vector of sectoral shares
ajs, our object of interest, Var(qj), can be written as:
Var(qj) = a
0
j E(yjy
0
j)aj: (2)
Thus, in order to decompose Var(qj) we need to decompose the variance-covariance matrix
of the innovations to sectoral growth rates, E(yjy0j).
Given (1), simple matrix algebra shows that the variance-covariance matrix of country
js sectoral shocks can be written as:9
E(yjy
0
j) = 
 + 
"j + !
2
j11
0 + (
j1
0 + 1
0j) +  j (3)
where:

 = E(
0);

"j = diag(
2
j1:::
2
jS);
!2j = E(
2
j);

j = E(j);
1 denotes the S  1 vector of ones, and  and  denote the vectors of sectoral shocks
(s) and country shocks (j), respectively. The matrix 
 is the variance-covariance of
sector-specic global shocks; 
"j is the matrix collecting the variances of the sector- and
country-specic residuals "js, 2js = E("
2
js); !
2
j
is the variance of country-specic shocks;

j is the covariance between country-specic and global sectoral shocks; and nally, as
shown in Appendix A, the matrix  j collects the remaining components of E(yjy0j), that is,
the covariances between the residuals and the sectoral and country-specic shocks, E("js)
and E("jsj), respectively, and the covariance among residuals,E("js; "js0), for s 6= s0.10
As we later show, it turns out that the term  j plays a quantitatively negligible role
in accounting for aggregate volatility. We come back to the quantitative assessment of  j
term "js. When we later estimate this alternative model, we nd that Bj and bs are fairly close to 1, and
hence the quantitative measures of risk we derive are not sensitive to this alternative decomposition. This
implies that, empirically, the term "js in (1) reects mostly country- and sector-specic shocks (rather than
di¤erential exposure by sector or by country).
9Appendix A presents the matrix algebra.
10The model also allows for correlation of country-specic shocks across countries. Hence, we could further
decompose the country-specic variance and quantify covariances of country shocks across regions (or group
of countries). For simplicity, the exposition ignores these correlations.
4
in Section 4.3.11 In anticipation of that result, the exposition that follows ignores this last
component. More specically, we will maintain the working hypothesis that the residual
shocks are idiosyncratic (uncorrelated with each other and with the sector- and country-
specic shocks), and hence  j is null. This implies that we can write the variance-covariance
matrix as:
E(yjy
0
j) = 
 + 
"j + !
2
j11
0 + (
j1
0 + 1
0j): (4)
Plugging (4) into (2), we get:
Var(qj) = a
0
j E(yjy
0
j)aj = a
0
j
aj + a
0
j
"jaj + !
2
j
+ 2(a0j
j): (5)
It is convenient to further decompose the term a0j
"jaj into the sum of a pure Hernd-
ahl concentration index c a0jaj = c
PS
s=1 a
2
js, and the purely idiosyncratic-risk component,
a0j(
"j   cI)aj =
PS
s=1(
2
js  c)a2js, where c is a (constant) scalar, obtained as the average of
2js:
12 Aggregate volatility can hence be written as:
Var(qj) = a
0
j E (yjy
0
j)aj = a
0
j
aj + a
0
j(
"j   cI)aj + c a0jaj + !2j + 2(a0j
j): (6)
This formulation clearly shows that production in country j is more volatile:
1. if the country specializes in risky sectors, that is, sectors exposed to large and frequent
shocks. This is reected in the rst two terms:
(a) The rst, a0j
aj, relates to global sectoral shocks. This term is large when
sectors exposed to big and frequent global shocks account for a large share of the
countrys employment. For example, if the textiles sector is highly volatile in all
countries, then countries with high shares of textiles will tend to exhibit a large
value for a0j
aj.
(b) The second term, a0j(
"j   cI)aj =
PS
s=1(
2
js   c)a2js; relates to idiosyncratic
sectoral shocks. This term is large when sectors with high idiosyncratic volatility,
2js, account for a large share of employment. For example, suppose textiles is
particularly volatile in country j (and also more volatile than other sectors in j);
then, if the share ajs of textiles in country j is large, the country will exhibit a
large value for
PS
s=1(
2
js   c)a2js:
11Note that the term  j will be potentially important in the case of a large idiosyncratic shock in big,
highly specialized countries. To see why, suppose, for example, that a draught severely a¤ects co¤ee crops in
Brazil. This raises the world price of co¤ee, which acts as a positive global shock for all other producers of
co¤ee but is a negative shock for Brazil. Thus "js will be correlated with global sectoral shocks. Empirically,
however, as we show later, such shocks do not play a substantial role in our sample.
12A constant 2js would result if we imposed the restriction that sectoral shocks are uncorrelated and
homoscedastic.
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2. if the country specializes in few sectors. This is reected in a large value for the
Herndahl concentration index c a0jaj = c
PS
s=1 a
2
js. This component reaches its max-
imum when the country is totally concentrated in one sector (ajs = 1 and ajs = 0 for
s 6= s).
3. if country risk (!2j) is big, that is, the country is more volatile if aggregate domestic
shocks are larger and more frequent.
4. if specialization is tilted towards sectors whose shocks are positively correlated with
country-specic shocks (a0j
j is big). This term will tend to be small, for example,
if policy innovations are negatively correlated with the shocks to sectors that have a
large share in country js employment. For example, if monetary policy in country j
reacts countercyclically to shocks in the textiles sector, and textiles account for a large
share of the economy, then this term will tend to be small, and possibly negative.
Thus, the aggregate volatility of the economy can be decomposed as the sum of com-
ponents with fundamentally di¤erent meanings. Empirical papers studying diversication
typically focus on the Herndahl index (or other concentration indices) as a measure of di-
versication. This is an ideal measure to capture the riskiness of the sectoral structure (and
the lack of diversication) under the assumption that sectors are homoscedastic and uncor-
related. In this case, e¢ cient diversication clearly dictates an even distribution of sectors,
and any deviation from this can be coined a lack of diversication.The decomposition we
perform indicates that to measure diversication it is important to take into account the
riskiness embedded in a particular sectoral structure.
1.2 Estimating the Model
In order to quantify the various components of volatility in equation (6), we need to estimate
the variance-covariance matrices 
, 
"j , !
2
j
, and 
j . Our general strategy is to use data
across countries, sectors, and time to back out estimates of the sectoral shocks, s, and the
country shocks, j. We then compute the sample variances and covariances of the estimated
shocks and treat them as estimates of the corresponding population moments.
Innovations to growth in value-added per worker in country j and sector s, yjst, are
computed as the deviation of the growth rate from the average (growth rate) of country j
and sector s over time.
We measure global sector-specic shocks as the cross-country average of yjst in each of
the sectors. Country-specic shocks are then identied as the within-country average of
yjst, using only the portion not explained by sector-specic shocks. The residual is then the
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di¤erence between yjst and the two shocks. Formally,
^st  1
J
JX
j=1
yjst;
^jt  1
S
SX
s=1
(yjst   ^st) (7)
"^jst  yjst   ^st   ^jt
Note that we normalize shocks so that
PJ
j=1 jt = 0, that is, country shocks are expressed
as relative to world shocks.
An equivalent way to formalize this is to frame the analysis as a set of cross-sectional
regressions of yjst on country and sector dummies. More specically, the formulas for ^st,
^jt; and "^jst given above will be the result of running a regression, for each time t, of yjst, on
a set of sector-specic and country-specic dummies. (See the derivation in Appendix (B).)
The econometric specication is:13
yjst = 1td1 + :::+ StdS + 1th1 + :::+ JthJ + "jst (8)
where ds, s = 1; :::S; are dummy variables that take the value 1 for sector s, and 0 otherwise,
and hj, j = 1; :::J; are dummy variables taking the value 1 for country j, and 0 otherwise.
The estimated coe¢ cients ^st and ^jt, and the residuals "^jst are, respectively, the global
sector-s-specic shock, country-j-specic shock, and the (s; j)-country-and-sector-specic
shock at time t:
Estimates of the matrices 
, 
j , !
2
j
, and 
"j are then computed using the estimated
shocks. In particular, 
^ = 1T
PT
t=1 ^t^
0
t is the estimated variance-covariance of global-
sectoral shocks;14 !^2j =
1
T
PT
t=1 ^
2
jt is the estimated variance of country-j-specic shocks;

^j =
1
T
PT
t=1 ^t^jt is the estimate of the covariance between sectoral shocks and country-j
shocks; and ^2js =
1
T
PT
t=1 "^
2
jst, with s = 1; :::; S are the estimated variances of the sectoral
idiosyncratic shocks.15
13For each cross section of data, the number of observations is J S, and the number of regressors is J +S:
14The vector of estimated sectoral shocks, ^t has elements ^st.
15A fast reading might lead some to mistakenly think that, by construction, the regressions impose or-
thogonality conditions between "^jst and ^st (and between "^jst and ^jt). Note that this is not the case. The
specication in (8) implies that the residuals "^jst are uncorrelated with the sectoral and country dummies,
but not necessarily with the shocks ^st and ^jt. In fact, as we later discuss, these correlations are non-
zero, though they are quantitatively small and this is why we opt to ignore them. This is a result, not an
assumption.
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Given the estimates of the variance-covariance matrix of factors, we use data on sectoral
labor shares, asjt, to compute the ve measures of risk exposure:
GSECTjt = a
0
jt
^ajt (9)
ISECTjt = a
0
jt(
^"j   cI)ajt (10)
HERFjt = c a
0
jtajt (11)
CNTj = !^
2
j
(12)
COVjt = 2a
0
jt
^j (13)
where GSECTjt is the part of the volatility of country j at time t due to sectoral shocks
that are common to all countries; ISECTjt is the part of volatility due to sectoral shocks
idiosyncratic to country j; HERFjt measures the level of sectoral concentration of country
j at time t; CNTj is the part of volatility due to country shocks (which, by construction,
does not depend on time); and COVjt is the covariance of global sectoral shocks with the
jth country shock at time t.
1.3 Related Empirical Applications
The econometric model specied in (8), known as a factor model, is popular in nance
applications, where it is used to decompose volatility of asset returns. A similar procedure
to study shocks is adopted by Stockman (1988), who decomposes the growth of industrial
output in seven European countries. Ghosh and Wolf (1997) carry out this exercise for U.S.
states. Methodologically related is a study by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), who use
this decomposition for stock market uctuations. These studies focus on the qualitative
distinction between country shocks and industry shocks, but not on the quantitative risk
measures, which is the object we pursue in our analysis.
The factor model could also be estimated by maximum likelihood, treating only the co-
variance matrix of uctuations as observed but not the realizations of shocks themselves.
(See nance applications in Connor and Korajczyk, (1986) and (1988); Lehmann and Mod-
est, (1985a) and (1985b); and Brooks and Del Negro (2002).) Del Negro (2002) uses this
methodology to analyze aggregate economic uctuations of U.S. states. Recently, Kose et al.
(2003) have applied a latent factor model to detect common uctuations of output, consump-
tion and investment across countries. In this approach, the estimation assumes a particular
joint distribution of shocks (typically orthogonal standard normals) in order to estimate the
factor loadings. They focus on identifying the world business cycle, captured by a common
world factor. Our model is more general in the sense that we allow for as many global factors
as the number of sectors. We discuss di¤erences with our approach in the robustness section.
Our use of cross-sectional regressionmethodology is convenient because it makes mini-
mal assumptions on the way factors can covary. A potential problem with this method arises
in the case of large measurement errors, which could raise the variability of cross-sectional
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means relative to the variability of the true factors. In Appendix C, we show that the po-
tential biases associated with this are very small given the number of countries and sectors,
and the relative size of the variances 2js.
2 Data
To compute the di¤erent dimensions of risk in our benchmark exercise, we employ annual
data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2002). The
UNIDO data set covers all manufacturing at the 3-digit level of disaggregation from 1963
to 1998 for a broad sample of countries, providing information on sectoral employment and
value added. The list of countries included in the analysis is displayed in Table 1.
The original data set contains 28 sectors. However, several countries aggregate value
added, employment, and/or output for two or more sectors into one larger sector. For exam-
ple, various countries group food productsand beveragestogether. To make the data
comparable, we aggregate sectors so as to obtain a consistent classication across countries.
This aggregation leaves us with 19 sectors, which are listed in Table 2.
Data on value added and output are expressed both in domestic currencies and U.S.
dollars. In the benchmark analysis, we use real value added (per worker) in U.S. dollars.16
It is worth noting that we do not nd signicant di¤erences in our results when looking at
the output series. We discuss this issue in the Robustness Section.
Our benchmark analysis focuses on a broad set of countries with detailed Manufacturing
data. As a robustness check, we perform a similar exercise using data on value added
and labor in Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Services. The information comes from the
OECDs STAN Industrial Structure Analysis. A drawback of this data set is that it provides
information on a smaller set of countries, particularly developed ones. However, the quality
of these data is likely higher, and it covers all sectors in the economy. As we comment later in
the Robustness Section, applying the factor model to this subsample conrms the empirical
regularities found in the UNIDO manufacturing data.
We focus on the variance of the growth rate of value added per worker. In the benchmark
exercise, we take ve-year moving averages of growth rates on the grounds that the relevant
uctuations that inuence the choice of sectoral structure of a country may occur over
the medium to long horizon. In this way we can also reduce high frequency noise due to
measurement error. It turns out that, in practice, similar patterns emerge when using one-
year growth rates of value-added per worker. (These results are not reported in the paper,
but are available at request from the authors).
As a measure of development, we use PPP adjusted real GDP per capita from the Penn
World Tables 6.1.
16We use the CPI to convert gures into constant dollars.
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3 Results
This section is split into three subsections. The rst (3.1) briey introduces the reader to the
estimates of the ve components of volatility. The second (3.2) investigates more systemati-
cally the relationship between the various measures of risk and economic development. The
third (3.3) presents the results of a volatility accounting exercise. The results reported in
this section are based on the benchmark UNIDO data set.
3.1 Decomposition of Risk
We begin in Table 3 by illustrating the decomposition of risk, by country in 1990. (The
Figures in the next Section display the corresponding numbers for all years.) The numbers
are expressed as variance components (not standard deviations).17
The rst column shows our measure of global sectoral risk, as gauged by expression (9):
GSECTjt = a
0
jt
ajt. The key element of this component is the variance-covariance of
global sectoral shocks, 
, which measures the intrinsic riskiness of the various sectors that
is common to all countries. In 1990 the top three countries according to this dimension of
risk are Pakistan, Iran, and India, whereas Singapore, Israel and Ireland exhibit the lowest
levels of global sectoral risk.
The second column shows the idiosyncratic sectoral risk, as expressed in (10): ISECTjt =
a0jt(j   cI)ajt =
P
s(
2
js   c)a2js. This term captures the role played by the idiosyncratic
variances of sectoral shocks, 2js. A positive (negative) number implies that the sectoral
structure of the country exhibits higher (lower) idiosyncratic risk than the benchmark of
constant variance (2js = c). The countries with highest idiosyncratic sectoral risk in 1990
are Ecuador, Philippines, and Iran. In contrast, Denmark, Sweden, and Japan display the
lowest level of idiosyncratic sectoral risk.
The third column shows the concentration index resulting from expression (11): HERFjt =
c a0jaj = c
P
s a
2
js. The countries with highest Herndahl indices are Bolivia, Uruguay, Kenya,
Ecuador, and Philippines. Canada, South Africa, and Korea are the countries with lowest
concentration levels.
The fourth column displays the country-specic risk, !2j . Peru, Philippines, Iran, Bolivia,
and Israel are the riskiest countries, whereas Ireland, the United States, Finland, Austria,
and Canada qualify as the the safest.
The fth column indicates the sector-country covariance, that is, the covariance between
sector and country specic shocks: COVjt = a0jt
j . Peru, Chile, Greece, and Japan show
the highest covariance, whereas India, Pakistan, South Africa exhibit the lowest covariances.
The sixth and nal column presents the sum of the ve components.
17We express them in terms of variance components so as to emphasize the additive contribution to total
variance. Since growth of labor productivity is computed over a ve-year interval (moving averages), the
reader interested in annualized standard deviations should compute the squared root after dividing by 5.
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Note that not only are there important di¤erences in the quantitative measures of risk
across countries, but also there is enormous variance across countries regarding the shares
of the di¤erent dimensions of risk. For example, in Iran, the sectoral concentration and the
sectoral risk contribute little to the extremely high risk of the economy. Most of the risk is
country specic. For France, instead, a signicant part of the risk (33 percent) is explained
by the high covariance between country- and sector-specic risk. The United Kingdom, in
contrast, has a relatively large negative sector-country covariance, which contributes to lower
overall risk.
Even though Kose et al. (2003) do not address sectoral specialization and its impact on
volatility, we can compare the aggregate behavior of our factor model to theirs by looking
at the broad patterns in both variance decomposition exercises. Despite the di¤erences in
methodology discussed above, the aggregate patterns are remarkably close. For the median
country in their sample, global shocks account for 14:7 percent of the total volatility in
output. We estimate that, for the median country, 16:8 percent of overall risk is attributable
to global sectoral shocks. Our median share of country shocks (including here the covariance
with sectors) is 69:9 percent, compared to their 65:0 (Kose et al. (2003)). By separating
sectoral uctuations, however, we can focus on the di¤erences across sectors and sectoral
diversication as two key determinants behind volatility patterns. This is what we turn to
in the next Section.
In Table 4 we present the summary statistics by sector for the each of the 19 sectors in
the benchmark analysis. The rst column presents the standard deviations of innovations in
the growth rate of value-added per worker, and the second displays the average correlations
of each sector with the rest. The range of standard deviations goes from 4 percent to 14
percent. Note that the sectoral shocks exhibit high correlations with each other, the average
correlation coe¢ cient running from 0:52 to 0:71.
3.2 Diversication Along the Development Process
3.2.1 A note on the methodology
In order to characterize the evolution of the various dimensions of risk in the development
process, we use both non-parametric and parametric techniques.
The non-parametric methodology we use, known as LOWESS, elicits the shape of the
relationship between two variables imposing practically no structure on the functional form.
More specically, LOWESS provides a locally weighted smoothing, based on the following
method: Consider two variables, zi and xi, and assume that the data are ordered so that
xi  xi+1 for i = 1; :::; N   1. For each value zi, the method calculates a smoothed value,
zsi ; obtained by running a regression of zi on xi using a small number of data points near
this point; the regression is weighted so that the central point (xi; zi) receives the highest
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weight and points farther away get less weight.18 The smoothed value zsi is then the weighted
regression prediction at xi: The procedure is carried out for each observation the number
of regressions is equal to the number of observations and the tted curve is the set of all
(xi; z
s
i ):
We look at risk patterns both across countries and across time within countries. The
within-country variation shows how our risk measures change with development over time
after controlling for country xed e¤ects.
We employ these non-parametric methods to uncover the relationship between each di-
mension of risk and the level of development (real per capita GDP). We also use standard
parametric techniques to complement the analysis. The results are presented in the next
subsections.
3.2.2 Di¤erent dimensions of risk in the development process
Non-parametric results We start the analysis by documenting the relationship between
the various dimensions of risk and (the log of) real GDP per capita, using the LOWESS
method described before.
We rst turn to the relationship between global sectoral risk (GSECT) and real GDP
per capita. Figure 2 exhibits the estimated cross-country relationship, and Figure 3 exhibits
the corresponding within-country relationship. Both plots uncover a negative correlation
between global sectoral risk and the level of development, which is remarkably strong in
the within-country evidence. The within-country evidence is perhaps more relevant in our
context, as it shows the evolution of global sectoral risk for the typical country along its
development path. (Or, in other words, it controls for country-specic e¤ects, which in a
simple cross section might blur the evolution of a given component of risk by shifting the
curve.)
Figure 4 shows the cross-country estimated relationship between idiosyncratic sectoral
risk (ISECT) and (the log of) real GDP per capita, and Figure 5 shows the corresponding
within-country estimated relationship. Both Figures show a mostly negative association
between this component of risk and development. In particular, as shown in Figure 4, rich
countries feature the lowest levels of idiosyncratic sectoral risk in absolute terms.
Figures 6 and 7 display the cross-country and within-country relationship between the
Herndahl index and development. The graphs exhibit a declining curve at low levels of
income, which attens out at medium levels of income and starts increasing again at higher
levels. The relationship between the extent of concentration and development has been
recently studied by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), who reported a U-shape relationship as the
one displayed in these Figures.
18The subset of data used in the calculation of zsi corresponds to the interval [xi k; xi+k], where k deter-
mines the width of the intervals and the weights for each of the observations between the interval, xj , with
j = i  k; :::; i+ k are: wj =

1 
 jxj xij
D
33
, and D = 1:0001max(xi+k   xi; xi   xi k)
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Putting all pieces together, the Figures show that at early stages of development, coun-
tries tend to concentrate heavily on relatively high-risk sectors. As countries grow, they
shift production towards lower-risk sectors, experiencing a decrease in both global and idio-
syncratic sectoral risks together with a decrease in concentration. Later in the development
process, while global and idiosyncratic sectoral risks continue to decline, concentration tends
to atten out and even reverses to higher levels at su¢ ciently large values of per capita GDP.
However, this higher levels of concentration at later stages of development tends to fall into
sectors with lower levels of global and idiosyncratic risk.
A closer look into the change in sectoral composition reinforces the claim that more
developed countries move resources from riskier to less risky sectors. As illustrations, Figures
8 through 11 plot the employment shares in the textile industry (a highly risky sector with
a standard deviation of shocks of 8 percent) and the electric machinery industry (the safest
sector, with a standard deviation of 4 percent) against the log-level of GDP per capita. The
plots present both the cross country and the within-country relations. As anticipated, the
electric machinery sector expands with development while textile monotonically shrinks.
The relationship between country-specic risk and the level of development is displayed
in Figure 12. Remember that, by construction, there is no within-country variation over time
for this dimension of risk, hence we only plot the data corresponding to 1990 for each country.
The evidence points to a negative relationship. This suggests that countries at higher levels
of development enjoy higher macroeconomic stability, which could be the result of lower
political risks and better conduct of scal and monetary policies, among other factors.
Finally, the evolution of the covariance between sector and country specic shocks along
the development process is shown in Figures 13 and 14, both in the cross-country and the
within-country versions. While there is considerable variability in the covariances, the cross-
sectional evidence indicates no systematic relationship with the level of development.
Parametric results This section briey summarizes the relationship between the di¤erent
dimensions of risk and the level of development, using standard regression analysis. Based
on the non-parametric ndings, we explore the t of rst and second-order polynomials. (We
also explore higher-order polynomials, but the additional functional freedom turns out to be
insignicant.) The results are summarized in Table 5.
As already suggested by the graphs, global sectoral risk decreases during the development
process, both in the cross-sectional and in the within-country evidence. The coe¢ cient on
the squared GDP term in the regression without xed e¤ects is positive, suggesting that the
curve eventually attens out; the estimated critical point at which the curve is perfectly at
occurs at very high values of income (out of sample).
The within-country evidence provides perhaps cleaner measures for the assessment of
theoretical models, as it characterizes the evolution of each component of risk in the devel-
opment path for the typical country.
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Turning to the idiosyncratic sectoral risk component, the regressions show a generally
decreasing pattern (there appears to be a slightly increasing phase at early stages of devel-
opment, but it turns out not be statistically signicant).
Regarding the Herndahl index, the within variation conrms that it rst decreases with
(the log of per capita) GDP, until GDP reaches the critical point of US $6; 433 (with US
$292 standard error). From this point on, the index starts increasing with development.
Note that this point corresponds, approximately, to the 62nd percentile value in our sample,
that is, the kink point of the weighted Herndahl index occurs at an advanced stage in the
development process.19
Country risk is negatively correlated with the level of development. (The coe¢ cient on
the (log) GDP in this last case is  0:031, with a 0:02 robust standard error). Finally, the
sector-country covariance does not show any systematic pattern in the data.
The result of all these dimensions of risk is that the overall riskiness of the economys
output mix rst decreases until it reaches the critical point of US $16; 520 (with US $1; 822
standard error) in the cross section and US $10; 156 (with US $1; 099 standard error) , after
which the curve tends to atten out. Note that this occurs later than the critical point of the
weighted Herndahl index, because global and idiosyncratic sectoral risk as well as country
risk continue to decline at higher stages of development (counteracting the attening out of
the weighted Herndahl index).
3.3 Volatility Accounting
As documented in the previous Figures and Tables, poor countries are more volatile because
they exhibit higher levels of i) global sectoral risk (GSECT), ii) idiosyncratic sectoral risk
(ISECT), iii) concentration (HERF), and iv) country-specic risk. The covariance term,
while showing non-negligible dispersion, is not systematically related to the level of devel-
opment. In the volatility accounting exercise that follows, we hence focus on the rst four
components.20
The question we ask in this section is: What fraction of the di¤erence in volatility between
poor and rich countries can be quantitatively accounted for by di¤erences in each of the
sources of volatility? Or, perhaps more relevant from a policy point of view: What fraction
of the di¤erence in volatility is due to the sectoral composition of the economy vis-à-vis
aggregate domestic risk. To do this, we take the averages of the various measures of risk for
the countries in the bottom and top income decile and compute the di¤erences between the
two groups in each of the components. We then express them as a proportion of the total
19Population weights were used to compute the percentiles. The unweighted percentile is 50.
20One possibility for the accounting exercise is to add the covariance term to the country-specic compo-
nent, since the rst does not follow any systematic pattern with respect to development. In particular, if
one interprets the covariance term as the domestic-policy response to sectoral shocks, the covariance would
be inextricably linked to the measure of country-risk. We follow this path here, but invite interested readers
to try other alternatives.
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di¤erence in volatility between the two groups. Hence, the contribution of country-specic
risk (CTY) to the di¤erence in volatility (Var(q)) between poor and rich countries is:
CTYshare =
CTYpoor   CTYrich
Var(qpoor)  Var(qrich) = 57%;
where poordenotes the average of the bottom income decile and richthe corresponding
average for the top decile. The remaining 43 percent of the di¤erence in volatility is due to
the sectoral composition of the economy. This in turn is decomposed in the part due to pure
concentration, which accounts for 12 percent of the total di¤erence, and sectoral risk, which
makes up the remaining 31 percent (7 percent due to Global Sectoral Risk and 25 percent
due to Idiosyncratic Sectoral Risk).
All components of volatility account for a non-negligible share of the di¤erences in total
volatility. In particular, the sectoral composition of a country, which jointly determines the
level of sectoral risk and the concentration level, accounts for 43 percent of the di¤erence; this
underscores the usefulness of looking at the sectoral composition of the economy. However,
the volatility-accounting exercise also highlights the huge role of aggregate domestic risk in
explaining the di¤erences in volatility between poor and rich countries. The volatility break-
down suggests that policy e¤orts should probably focus on reducing macroeconomic-policy
volatility rather than following the more intricate and delicate path of directed diversication
(a path popular in Latin American countries), which, though potentially successful in terms
of reducing volatility, might entail high costs in terms of economic distortions.
4 Robustness and Extensions
We perform several robustness checks. For space considerations, we do not present all the
corresponding tables and gures in the paper. They are available at request from the authors.
4.1 Accounting for Agriculture and Services
Up to now, our analysis has focused on manufacturing. In this section, we extend the analysis
to agriculture and services. One limitation, however, is that we have a long series on value
added and employment in agriculture, manufacturing, and services for a only a small sample
of OECD countries. Table 6 displays the decomposition of risk for 1990.
Interestingly, the empirical regularities we document, in particular the sharp decline in the
two measures of sectoral risk with the level of development, are exacerbated when one takes
into account agriculture and services in the analysis. This is illustrated in Figures 15 and 16,
which display global sectoral risk against development, and Figures 17 and 18, which display
the corresponding graphs for the idiosyncratic sectoral component. The reason for this result
is that agriculture, a relatively important sector at lower-income levels, behaves like the high-
volatility industries, whereas Services, an important sector in developed countries, mimics
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the behavior of less volatile industries. More specically, as shown in Table 7, the standard
deviations of shocks are 8:1 percent in agriculture, 5:4 percent in manufacturing, and 4:6
percent in services. This leads to a marked decline in sectoral risk as countries develop,
shifting the composition of output from agriculture to manufacturing to services.21 The
Herndahl index increases at high levels of development (given that the sample only shows
high-income countries, Figures 19  20 show mainly the increasing part); country risk tends
to decline with development (Figure 21), though the relationship here is visually less striking
than before, since there is much less variation in income levels; nally, there is no strong
relationship between the covariances and the level of development (Figures 22 and 23).
4.2 An Alternative Way of Partitioning the Data
In section 1, we have proposed the partition (1) as our benchmark breakdown of the data.
Shocks to the value-added growth in a sector are due to a sector specic innovation, a
country specic innovation, and a country-sector-specic innovation. In this specication, if
a country-specic shock, j, has a di¤erent impact depending on the sector, the di¤erential
impact is reected in the country-sector specic disturbance, "js. Similarly, if a global-
sectoral shock has a di¤erent impact depending on the country, that is reected in "js.
We could, however, have adopted a di¤erent way of capturing the di¤erential e¤ects
(by sector) of country shocks and (by country) of global sectoral shocks. In particular, an
alternative way of breaking-down the data would be the following:
yjs = Bjs + bsj + "js; (14)
where Bj is the exposure of country j to worldwide sectoral shock s (potentially related to
overall openness), and bs is the sensitivity of sector s to country j shock (related to the
cyclicality of the sector). Writing this factor model in vector notation:
yj = Bj+ jb+ "j; (15)
which implies the following variance decomposition,22
eE(yjy0j) = B2j
 + !2jbb0 + (Bj
jb0 +Bjb
0j) + 
"j : (16)
21Previous studies of structural transformation in the development process have emphasized the shift from
low to high productivity sectors. (See for example Caselli and Coleman (2001) and the references therein.)
Our results indicate that the structural transformation process is also characterized by a shift from high to
low volatility sectors).
22Ignoring, as we did before, the term  j , which we discuss next.
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Our modied risk measures are dened as follows.
G^SECTjt = B
2
j a
0
jt
ajt (17)
^ISECTjt = a0jt(
"j   cI)ajt (18)
H^ERFjt = c a
0
jtajt (19)
]CNTj = !2j(a0jtb)2 (20)
]COVjt = 2a0jtBjb
0j (21)
We estimated the exposures to shocks by running time-series OLS regressions of innova-
tions in the growth rate of value-added per worker on the predicted shocks realizations.
Note that, because factor realizations are predicted with error, the loading estimates will be
somewhat biased towards one. The bias decreases with the number of countries and sectors
and increases with the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk.
We nd that the new risk measures exhibit similar patterns to those generated by the
benchmark model, both across countries and within countries. The main reason for this is
that the estimated exposures are very close to one, which is our benchmark assumption.
Exposure to country shocks ranges from 0:82 (Paper and products) to 1:10 (Furniture),
whereas exposure to global shocks is never signicantly di¤erent from one (ranging from
0:89 to 1:09). This suggests that the sectoral structure already captures the bulk of exposure
to global shocks. The similarity of the results from the two di¤erent factor models should
perhaps not be surprising. The di¤erential exposures were previously captured in the residual
term "js. As mentioned before, the term  j which previously captured the correlations
between "js and j and between "js and s, played a small quantitative role, which suggests
that Bj and bs would not be too di¤erent from 1.
As mentioned before, one implication of this result is that the term "js in (1) empirically
reects mostly shocks that are specic to a sector and country, rather than di¤erential
exposures to global sectoral or country-pecic shocks.
Specication (15) is very similar to the one applied by Del Negro (2002) and Kose et al.
(2003), who allow the impact of global shocks to vary by country (or by states in Del Negro
(2002)). This makes the results of this exercise more directly comparable to theirs. The key
distinction is that we use sectoral data, whereas Del Negro (2002) and Kose et al. (2003) use
macroeconomic aggregates. This has two important implications. First, since the bench-
mark factor model lets global shocks vary sector by sector, we already incorporated some
heterogeneity in the global exposure of countries, the sensitivity to global shocks being deter-
mined by the sectoral structure of the economy. As we have documented earlier, di¤erences
in sectoral composition imply substantial variation in the riskiness of the economy. Factor
models working with aggregates can only capture this variation if they assume di¤erential
global exposure of countries. Second, by looking at sectoral data, we can investigate how a
country can endogenously shield itself from global uctuations. Studies based on aggregate
uctuations cannot address this e¤ect of specialization.
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4.3 Are Residual Shocks Idiosyncratic?
Throughout the paper, we have maintained the working hypothesis that the residual ("js) is
idiosyncratic, that is, it is uncorrelated with each other and with country and sector shocks,
and hence we have ignored  j in (3). The question is how much is missed by ignoring this
term. Not much. The correlation between the actual variance Var(qj) and the sum of the
four components we account for, [a0j
aj+a
0
j
"jaj+!
2
j
+2(a0j
j)] is 0.99 (0.90 if looking
at log-variances). Furthermore, not only is a0j jaj zero on average, but the range of values
(from  0:04 to 0:05) is considerably smaller than that of Var(qj) (from 0:004  0:19).
Finally, and perhaps more importantly for the assessment of theories, the term a0j jaj,
a0j jaj = Var(qj) 
h
a0j
aj + a
0
j
"jaj + !
2
j
+ 2(a0j
j)
i
; (22)
is uncorrelated with the level of development.
4.4 Allowing for Time-Varying Measures of Risk
Recent studies have documented a sharp decline in volatility for the United States, around
the early 1980s (see Stock and Watson (2002) and the references therein). This consideration
led us to allow for time varying measures of risk. To explore this possibility, we split the
sample into two periods, before and after 1980, and apply the factor-model procedure to the
two subsamples.
We nd that there has been, on average, a decline in both sectoral and country volatility.
Surprisingly, the qualitative patterns do not change. The decline in volatility occurred
broadly across all sectors, and the volatility ranking of sectors shows only minor changes.
The correlation between the sectoral standard deviations based on the pre-1980 sample and
the standard deviations obtained with the pooled sample (i.e., the measures described before)
is 0:75. The corresponding correlation based on the post-1980 sample and the pooled sample
is 0:81. The data shows that on average sectoral volatility is lower in the post-1980 period
and, as before, countries tend to move to less risky sectors (that is, sectors with lower global
and idiosyncratic risk) with development. Pooling together the results obtained from the two
subsamples, we nd that the sectoral risk decreases even more sharply with development.
Country-specic risk has also changed over time, but the declining relationship with re-
spect to development is preserved in the two subsamples, and also preserved if the subsamples
are pooled together. Finally, the Herndahl index does not show signicant changes across
the two subsamples, whereas the covariances tend, on average, to be higher in the second
half.
We conclude from this exercise that while there have been changes in the underlying
measures of risk, they lead to a consistent decline in both sectoral and country risk. In other
words, our benchmark results, which should be viewed as summaries for the whole period,
do not mask di¤erent trends in the two subperiods.
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4.5 Allowing for Di¤erences Between Developing and Developed
Countries
In our analysis, the underlying global shocks to a given sector are assumed to be identical
across countries. One concern, however, is that shocks to industries in developing countries
might be di¤erent from the corresponding ones in developed ones. In this section, we relax
this restriction, by allowing sectoral shocks to be di¤erent between developing and developed
countries. In order to do so, we split the sample into two parts: (i) The subsample of countries
whose real GDP per capita was below the median in 1980 and (ii) the subsample of countries
with real GDP per capita above the median in 1980.
After controlling for country-e¤ects, we estimate the global sector-specic factors in each
of the two subsamples. As before, they are estimated as the cross-country average of innova-
tions in the growth rate of value-added per worker in each of the sectors. We then compute
the standard deviations of each sector in each subsample. The surprising and reassuring
nding is that the standard deviations are extremely similar, and the ranking of sectors by
standard deviations across the two subsamples is virtually identical. The correlation between
the standard deviations is 0:75. This indicates that our initial estimates capture the global
shocks to the sector fairly well.
Going one step deeper, one can compare the estimated realizations of factors (or shocks),
sector by sector. We nd that, as can be guessed for the high correlation between standard
deviations, for most sectors, the correlation of shocks between the low-income and high-
income subsamples is extremely high. There are two exceptions: One is Professional and
scientic equipment(the correlation of shocks here is only 0:17). The other is Industrial
chemicals and petroleum(with a correlation across subsamples of 0:27:) Regarding the rst,
it is a minor sector even within developed countries, and it is perhaps not well represented in
developing economies. As for the second, one interpretation is that supply shocksin the
oil sector of developing countries have large (and opposite) e¤ects on the terms of trade in
these economies. Hence, in this case, the resulting impact in labor productivity is di¤erent
for developed economies.
This exercise suggests that our benchmark model captures global sectoral shocks consid-
erably well, and little is gained by allowing for di¤erences between developing and developed
countries. In other words, the benchmark model captures global sectoral shocks almost as
well as this more permissive extension.
4.6 Allowing for Di¤erences Between Low-Trade and High-Trade,
Financially Open and Closed Countries, Small and Large
One natural question is whether global sectoral shocks have the same impact regardless of
the level of openness of the country. This was addressed in a general way before, by allowing
countries to have di¤erent exposure to global sectoral shocks. However, we can double check
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our previous conclusions by addressing the more specic question of whether more open
countries have di¤erent exposure to sectoral shocks than relatively closed countries. We test
this hypothesis by following a procedure similar to the one described before. That is, we
split the sample into two groups, according to a given measure of openness, and compute the
sector-specic factors for each of the two subsamples, after controlling for country e¤ects.
More specically, we consider three dimensions that relate to the openness of a country.
First, we calculate openness as exports plus imports divided by GDP from Penn World
Tables (openc). The correlation of the sectoral standard deviations between low-trade and
high-trade countries was remarkably high: 0:82. The ranking of sectors according to standard
deviations is very similar for the two subsamples. The split between low-trade and high-trade
countries, hence, does not lead to any signicant departure from the ndings based on the
benchmark model.
Second, we look at whether nancial openness signicantly a¤ects the exposure to global
shocks. Using data on nancial liberalization dates, we classify countries as nancially
open or close and estimate the sector-specic factors in the resulting two subsamples.23
The ranking of sectors by standard deviation, is, as in our previous exercises, remarkably
similar. The correlation of standard deviations of sectoral shocks between the two subsamples
is 0:77. While portfolio-view theories would predict di¤erent exposures depending on the
degree of nancial development, this exercise does not reveal signicant di¤erences. The high
correlation of risk between the subsamples (0:77) lends support to the simpler specication
of the benchmark model.
Finally, we test whether global shocks hit small and large countries di¤erently. We hence
split the sample into small and large countries using the median population in 1980 as the
dividing line. The ranking of sectors by standard deviation of shocks is again almost identical,
and the corresponding correlation of standard deviations between the two subsamples is 0:61:
We conclude from this exercise that the split between small and large countries does not point
to a signicant departure from the benchmark specication.
4.7 Alternative Measures of Labor Productivity
We checked the robustness of our results by computing economic shocks from data on output
per capita, rather than value added per capita. It can be argued that output per capita carry
less measurement error than value added. However, the main results obtained using value
added per capita remain mostly unaltered. Since value-added is more meaningful as an
indicator of well-being, we prefer to focus on this measure.
Second, we checked whether the UNIDO data in US dollars led to di¤erent ndings than
the data in domestic currency. We redid our exercise both for value added and output per
capita in both US dollars and domestic currency. As before, the patterns we document
23The data come from Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999).
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remain unaltered. The only di¤erence lies on a smaller average correlation of shocks among
sectors when using domestic currencies.
5 Concluding Remarks
Why is GDP growth so much more volatile in poor countries than in rich ones? The volatility-
accounting analysis points to three sources: (i) poor countries specialize in more volatile
sectors (explaining 31 percent of the di¤erences in volatility); (ii) poor countries specialize
in fewer sectors (explaining 12 percent of the di¤erence); (iii) poor countries experience more
frequent and more severe aggregate shocks (explaining 57 percent of the di¤erence).
The dynamic evolution of volatility along the development path displays robust regu-
larities: First, global and idiosyncratic sectoral risk decrease with the level of development,
that is, production tends to shift towards less risky sectors. Second, sectoral concentration
rst decreases with respect to development until it reaches a critical point at which it starts
increasing with development. Thus, the high concentration at early stages of development
typically falls in high risk sectors, which compounds the exposure to risk at early stages.
Third, country risk tends to decrease with the level of development. Fourth, the covari-
ance between sectoral risk and country risk does not vary systematically with the level of
development.
We argue that many theories linking volatility, diversication, and development are at
odds with some of these ndings. In particular, an important body of theoretical literature
predicts a move from sectors with low intrinsic volatility towards sectors with high intrinsic
volatility as countries develop, a prediction contradicted by the evidence.
These results suggests that a possible next step will be to explore the hypothesis that
low-risk sectors are high-skill intensive, or more generally, they are more intensive in the
use of sophisticated skills and technology. In Koren and Tenreyro (2005) we argue that
this could be the case if there is scope for technology diversication: a sector using a larger
variety of inputs can mitigate the uctuations a¤ecting the productivity of individual inputs.
This causes the productivity of sectors employing sophisticated technology to become less
volatile.24 Ultimately, we need a theory of what prevents countries from adopting more
complex technologies.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the Variance-Covariance Decomposi-
tion
We are interested in the expected value of yjy0j, where
yj = + j1+ "j
Multiplying this vector by its traspose, we get:
yjy
0
j = (+ j1+ "j)(
0 + j10 + "0j)
= 0 + 2j11
0 + j10 + j1
0 + "j"0j + "
0
j + "j
0 + j(1"0j + "j1
0) (23)
The term "j"0j can in turn be decomposed as the sum of a diagonal matrix with elements "
2
js
and a matrix containing the cross-products, "js"js0 for s 6= s0 that is
"j"
0
j = diag("
2
j1:::"
2
jS) + crossprod("js); where
diag("2j1; :::; "
2
jS) =
26664
"2j1 0 ::: 0
0 "2j2 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: "2jS
37775 and
crossprod("js) =
26664
0 "j1"j2 ::: "j1"jS
"j2"j1 0 ::: "jS"j1
::: ::: ::: :::
"jS"j1 "jS"j2 ::: 0
37775
Taking expectations in (23) and introducing some notation,

 = E(
0);

"j = diag(
2
j1:::
2
jS);
!2j = E(
2
j);

j = E(j);
 j = E

"0j + "j
0 + j(1"0j + "j1
0) + cp("js)

we obtain:
yjy
0
j = 
 + 
"j + !
2
j11
0 + (
j1
0 + 1
0j) +  j:
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B Cross-Sectional DummyRegression and SampleMeans
This appendix proves the equivalence between the cross-sectional mean estimator (7) dis-
cussed in Section 1.2 and the cross-sectional dummy regression estimator (8).
The coe¢ cients obtained from the regression of labor productivity on sector and country
dummies solve the following least-square-error problem:
min
;
"
Y  D
 


!#2
s.t. 10J = 0;
where Y is the JS  1 vector of shocks to labor productivity (containing the S sectors of
country 1 above the S sectors of country 2 etc.) and D is the JS (S+J) matrix of S sector
and J country dummies.
Note that we want to express country shocks relative to the world average, hence we
subtract 1=J from all of the country dummies. Writing out D,
D =
2666666664
1 0    1  1=J  1=J   
0 1    1  1=J  1=J   
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
1 0     1=J 1  1=J   
0 1     1=J 1  1=J   
...
...
...
...
...
...
3777777775
=
h
1J 
 IS
 
IJ   1J1J10J

 1Si :
The full set of dummies is perfectly collinear (the sum of the last J columns is zero), so
it is not possible to identify all the coe¢ cients independently. This is why we introduce
the additional constraint that country coe¢ cients sum to zero, 10J = 0. The rst-order
conditions hence require:
D0D
 


!
= D0Y; and (24)
10J = 0: (25)
In what follows, we verify that ((24)) and (25) hold for ^ and ^ dened in (7).
Let l =
P
j yj denote the S  1 vector of the sum of shocks across countries, m denote
the J  1 vector of the sum of shocks across sectors within a country, with elementsPs yjs,
and g = 10l denote the overall sum of shocks, across countries and sectors. It is easy to see
from (7) that ^ = l=J and ^ = m=S   1g=(JS).
D0Y =
 
l
m  1
J
1g
!
D0D =
"
JIs 0
0 S
 
IJ   1J1J10J
#
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Hence
D0D
 
^
^
!
=
 
l
m  1
J
1g
!
as required. It is easy to verify that ^ sums to zero, so it also satises the other identication
assumption.
This means that ^ and ^ will be equal to the coe¢ cients on the sectoral and country
dummies (relative to the cross-country average), respectively.
C Bias of the Estimated Factor Covariance Matrix
Assume for simplicity that idiosyncratic variance is the same across sectors and across coun-
tries, 2js = 
2 for all j and s. If the factor model exactly holds, then our estimated factors
relate to the true factors as follows.
^ =  +
1
J
JX
i=1
"i; (26)
^j = j +
1
S
"
J   1
J
SX
s=1
"js   1
J
SX
s=1
X
i6=j
"is
#
(27)
Then the second moments of these estimated factors are
E(^^
0
) = 
 +
2
J
I;
E(^^j) = 
j
E(^2j) = !
2
j
+
J   1
SJ
2:
(28)
The magnitude of the bias depends on the variance of idiosyncratic shocks (2), the number
of countries (J) and the number of sectors (S). Since there are 48 countries countries and
19 sectors in the data, the estimated factors are close the the true factors.
To assess the bias more precisely, take the average idiosyncratic variance, 2 = 0:05. The
bias in the sectoral covariance matrix (
^) is of the order 0:001. Our sectoral risk measure
would then increase by 0:001  a0jaj, approximately 0:00011. This is a negligible fraction of
the average sectoral risk. For country risk, the bias would be of order 0:0026. This is about
5 percent of the average country risk. Note that there is no bias in the covariance term.
27
 Australia Indonesia Philippines
Austria Iran, Islamic Rep. Poland
Bolivia Ireland Portugal
Canada Israel Singapore
Chile Italy South Africa
Colombia Japan Spain
Denmark Kenya Sweden
Ecuador Korea, Rep. Turkey
Finland Malaysia United Kingdom
France New Zealand United States
Greece Norway Uruguay
Hungary Pakistan Venezuela, RB
India Peru Zimbabwe
Table 1. List of Countries
 
 
 
1 Food products; Beverages; Tobacco
2 Textiles
3 Wearing apparel, except footwear
4 Leather products
5 Footwear, except rubber or plastic
6 Wood products, except furniture
7 Furniture, except metal
8 Paper and products
9 Printing and publishing
10 Industrial chemicals; Petroleum refineries; Petroleum and coal products
11 Rubber products
12 Plastic products
13 Pottery, china, earthenware; Glass; Other non-metallic mineral prod.
14 Iron and steel; Non-ferrous metals
15 Fabricated metal products; Machinery, except electrical
16 Machinery, electric
17 Transport equipment
18 Professional & scientific equipment
19 Other manufactured products
Table 2. List of Sectors
 
 
 
 Country
Global Sectoral 
Risk          
(1)
Idiosyncratic 
Sectoral      Risk 
(2)
Concentration     
(3)
Country Risk   
(4)
Sector-Country 
Covariance      
(5)
Overall Risk  
(6)=Σ(j)
Australia 0.327 -0.488 0.547 0.678 -0.632 0.432
Austria 0.325 -0.471 0.555 0.550 -0.131 0.828
Bolivia 0.317 1.491 0.884 6.579 -0.659 8.612
Canada 0.339 -0.400 0.470 0.581 -0.324 0.666
Chile 0.342 -0.448 0.741 3.304 0.865 4.804
Colombia 0.297 -0.391 0.572 1.525 -0.128 1.875
Denmark 0.266 -0.638 0.731 0.595 -0.254 0.700
Ecuador 0.310 0.352 0.825 1.058 0.309 2.854
Finland 0.340 -0.430 0.553 0.432 -0.140 0.755
France 0.323 -0.492 0.541 0.585 0.492 1.449
Greece 0.320 -0.475 0.595 1.923 0.963 3.326
Hungary 0.300 0.496 0.558 2.558 0.289 4.201
India 0.402 -0.275 0.725 2.416 -1.115 2.154
Indonesia 0.340 0.155 0.668 0.616 -0.160 1.619
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.412 0.303 0.683 6.825 -1.063 7.160
Ireland 0.258 -0.442 0.623 0.317 -0.215 0.541
Israel 0.256 -0.485 0.623 4.192 0.579 5.165
Italy 0.345 -0.446 0.533 1.765 0.360 2.557
Japan 0.299 -0.552 0.603 1.108 0.729 2.187
Kenya 0.338 -0.384 0.835 0.852 0.092 1.733
Korea, Rep. 0.321 -0.290 0.492 1.706 -0.646 1.584
Malaysia 0.282 -0.220 0.656 1.249 -0.666 1.301
New Zealand 0.299 -0.494 0.687 0.873 -0.355 1.010
Norway 0.332 -0.489 0.655 0.649 -0.392 0.756
Pakistan 0.476 0.169 1.120 2.223 -1.065 2.922
Peru 0.345 0.081 0.567 16.746 1.289 19.028
Philippines 0.262 0.316 0.769 7.506 -1.225 7.628
Portugal 0.319 -0.310 0.538 2.989 -0.221 3.315
Singapore 0.237 -0.422 1.044 1.591 -0.568 1.882
South Africa 0.333 -0.320 0.487 1.007 -0.735 0.772
Spain 0.325 -0.354 0.514 0.796 0.440 1.722
Sweden 0.367 -0.580 0.672 1.039 0.350 1.847
Turkey 0.393 -0.303 0.657 2.045 -0.456 2.336
United Kingdom 0.307 -0.473 0.540 0.654 0.364 1.393
United States 0.311 -0.483 0.514 0.320 -0.291 0.370
Uruguay 0.287 0.216 0.838 3.821 -0.012 5.151
Venezuela, RB 0.339 -0.141 0.568 3.571 -0.062 4.274
Zimbabwe 0.361 -0.118 0.585 2.556 0.375 3.760
Table 3. Different Dimensions of Risk, by Country, 1990.
Notes: The calculation of the risk measures is described in the text. All measures are additive components of the variance (and not standard deviations). All 
measures have been multiplied by 100 to ensure readability. The figures in the five columns (1) through (5) add up to the total in (6).
 Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Correlation 
1 Food products; Beverages; Tobacco 0.057 0.50
2 Textiles 0.089 0.72
3 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.050 0.58
4 Leather products 0.087 0.65
5 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 0.072 0.60
6 Wood products, except furniture 0.090 0.71
7 Furniture, except metal 0.065 0.46
8 Paper and products 0.108 0.56
9 Printing and publishing 0.046 0.71
10 Industrial chemicals; Petroleum refineries; Petroleum and coal products 0.070 0.59
11 Rubber products 0.080 0.52
12 Plastic products 0.075 0.69
13 Pottery, china, earthenware; Glass; Other non-metallic mineral prod. 0.051 0.69
14 Iron and steel; Non-ferrous metals 0.141 0.65
15 Fabricated metal products; Machinery, except electrical 0.061 0.66
16 Machinery, electric 0.050 0.52
17 Transport equipment 0.085 0.57
18 Professional & scientific equipment 0.066 0.52
19 Other manufactured products 0.070 0.56
Table 4. Variance and Correlations, by Sector
Sector
Notes: The first colum displays the standard deviation of global sectoral shocks in the sector. The second column is the average 
pairwise correlation of global shocks with the rest of the sectors.
Linear Relation
Country risk
Overall Within Overall Within Overall Within Overall Overall Within Overall Within
-0.028** -0.059** -0.316** -0.046** -0.134** 0.043** -3.174 -0.008 0.017** -3.659* -0.045**
(0.009) (0.002) (0.079) (0.012) (0.034) (0.012) (2.054) (0.261) (0.004) (2.000) (0.017)
R-squared 0.23 0.50 0.32 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.01
Quadratic Relation
Country risk
Overall Within Overall Within Overall Within Overall Overall Within Overall Within
-0.345* -0.063** 1.324 0.542** -1.236 -2.084** -31.553 -2.245 0.105* -3.406 -1.501**
(0.129) (0.021) (1.259) (0.142) (0.701) (0.128) (46.293) (5.873) (0.050) (52.496) (0.198)
0.018* 0.000 -0.095 -0.033** 0.064 0.119** 1.637 0.129 -0.005 1.753 0.081**
(0.007) (0.001) (0.071) (0.008) (0.039) (0.007) (2.556) (0.326) (0.003) (2.899) (0.011)
R-squared 0.31 0.50 0.34 0.03 0.40 0.21 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.05
Critical Point 12,344 3.20e+55 1,093 3,817 16,719 6,433 15,339 5,990 43,897 16,520 10,157
S.E. of Critical Point (3,785) (1.79e+58) (15,559) (947) (8665) (299) (14,217) (5,675) (4.72e+6) (1,823) (1,100)
Table 5. Different Dimensions of Risk and Economic Development, 1963-1998
Log GDP per capita 
(constant PPP $)
Global sectoral risk Idiosyncratic sectoral risk Sector-country covariance
Dependent Variable:
Dependent Variable:
Log GDP per capita 
(constant PPP $)
Log GDP per capita 
squared
Overall risk
Concentration Overall risk
Global sectoral risk Concentration Sector-country covarianceIdiosyncratic sectoral risk
Notes: Constants included---not reported. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Number of countries: 46. Standard errors for turning points computed with Delta method. Number of 
observations=1,175. All coefficients have been multiplied by 100 to ensure readability.
 
 
 
 
Country
Global 
Sectoral Risk  
(1)
Idiosyncratic 
Sectoral      
Risk (2)
Concentration  
(3)
Country 
Risk      
(4)
Sector-
Country 
Covariance  
(5)
Overall 
Risk      
(6)
Australia 0.224 -0.036 0.263 0.407 -0.219 0.640
Austria 0.259 -0.121 0.180 0.149 -0.090 0.377
Belgium 0.216 -0.077 0.258 0.186 -0.030 0.553
Canada 0.221 -0.045 0.268 0.390 0.000 0.833
Denmark 0.223 -0.091 0.246 0.129 -0.147 0.359
Finland 0.232 -0.152 0.216 0.109 -0.053 0.352
France 0.224 -0.140 0.240 0.152 -0.185 0.292
Italy 0.228 -0.140 0.210 0.115 -0.190 0.223
Japan 0.232 -0.160 0.204 0.191 0.061 0.530
Korea, Rep. 0.259 0.152 0.160 0.496 0.353 1.421
Netherlands 0.220 -0.034 0.262 0.214 0.056 0.719
Norway 0.225 -0.193 0.264 0.091 -0.015 0.372
Portugal 0.253 -0.114 0.174 0.378 -0.348 0.344
Spain 0.239 -0.099 0.209 0.107 0.086 0.542
Sweden 0.218 0.043 0.257 0.470 0.299 1.286
United Kingdom 0.215 -0.166 0.269 0.194 0.128 0.640
United States 0.217 -0.139 0.284 0.150 0.076 0.588
Table 6. Different Dimensions of Risk, by Country, 1990. OECD Subsample
Notes: The calculation of the risk measures is described in the text. All measures are additive components of the variance (and 
not standard deviations). All measures have been multiplied by 100 to ensure readability. The figures in the five columns (1) 
through (5) add up to the total in (6).
 
Table 7. Variance and Correlations, by Sector. OECD Subsample
Sector Standard Deviation Average Correlation 
Agriculture 0.081 0.28
Manufacturing 0.054 0.28
Services 0.047 0.30
Notes: The first colum displays the standard deviation of global sectoral shocks in the 
sector. The second column is the average pairwise correlation of global shocks with the 
rest of the sectors.
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Figure 2: Global Sectoral Risk
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Figure 3: Global Sectoral Risk (within)
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Figure 4: Idiosyncratic Sectoral Risk
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Figure 5: Idiosyncratic Sectoral Risk (within)
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Figure 6: Herfindahl Index
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Figure 7: Herfindahl Index(within)
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Figure 8: Textiles Share
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Figure 9: Textiles Share (within)
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Figure 10: Electric Machinery Share
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Figure 11: Electric Machinery Share(within)
fi
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
Co
un
try
 R
isk
8 8.5 9 9.5 10
Log Real GDP per capita (PPP)
bandwidth = .8
Figure 12: Country Risk
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Figure 13: Sector−Country Covariance
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Figure 14: Sector−Country Covariance(within)
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Figure 15: Sectoral Risk OECD Sample
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Figure 16: Sectoral Risk (within) OECD Sample
fi
−
.
00
2
−
.
00
1
0
.
00
1
.
00
2
Id
io
sy
nc
ra
tic
 S
ec
to
ra
l R
isk
8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5
Log Real GDP per capita (PPP)
bandwidth = .5
Mean adjusted smooth
Figure 17: Idiosyncratic Risk OECD Sample
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Figure 18: Idiosyncratic Risk (within) OECD Sample
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Figure 19: Herfindahl Index OECD Sample
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Figure 20: Herfindahl Index (within) OECD Sample
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Figure 21: Country Risk OECD Sample
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Figure 22: Sector−Country Covariance OECD Sample
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Figure 23: Sector−Country Covariance (within) −OECD Sample
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